tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.comments2023-05-14T05:07:39.606-04:00The Platonic MindscapeAllenhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10893074877315003628noreply@blogger.comBlogger71125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-9947894930711872142021-01-16T07:29:29.920-05:002021-01-16T07:29:29.920-05:00At the most basic level, Physicalism is the idea t...At the most basic level, Physicalism is the idea that only the physical exists.<br /><br />The idea itself exists, and is <b>not</b> physical.<br /><br />If the idea is converted to a sentence (as above) to communicate it, mull it over, or whatever, that sentence <i>may</i> be physical, however it depends upon the non-physical idea, which does not depend upon anything physical.<br /><br />Thus, Physicalism is <i>(at the very least)</i> self-conflicting and thus arguably irrational.austuxhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18249117910853971058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-26442875959967909462015-10-12T18:53:26.606-04:002015-10-12T18:53:26.606-04:00This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.Bren + Lucyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05087946047217163847noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-90948763680420917292015-01-24T15:30:00.303-05:002015-01-24T15:30:00.303-05:00While I don't think that intelligence or for t...While I don't think that intelligence or for that matter any quality of being *exists* in the way that a piece of paper or a tree exists, I do believe we have influence and that influence is based on what we pay attention to, the quality of our attention, and how long we pay attention to it. I think attention, in a probabilistic Universe, is the guiding principle that allows there to be a narrative i.e unless I pay attention to this test, then the "determined" outcome cannot be realized. The type of attention I pay is determined by attention as it was in previous states--did I "prime" myself for this test by looking at older tests and familiarizing myself with the structure? Is my attention convoluted by attending to things that are irrelevant to the test itself? pmath325noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-40654393552395630602015-01-24T15:18:31.286-05:002015-01-24T15:18:31.286-05:00"Not a promising situation - because any expl..."Not a promising situation - because any explanation must be based entirely on conscious experiences which have no intrinsic meaning, and arrived at via conscious processes which are equally lacking in intrinsic meaning."<br /><br />I think this is where the world of art and general human connection lies - we attempt to translate the purity of our conscious states, as artists, by whittling ourselves down to our essences, and putting that into some form/medium. I also think this is a truth available to us when we consume psychedelics.<br /><br />"Well - it seems like there is either an explanation for this - or it just a brute fact that has no explanation.<br /><br /> If there is no explanation, then we should just accept our non-acceptance, our non-stoppingness, and let it go. Or not. Doesn’t matter."<br /><br />I love this. It sounds right out of the Pali Cannon. But I don't know... It is unfulfilling, which I think is an aspect of the nature of things itself. I do think that there are patterns within our conscious experience that are worth understanding. I think certain states lead to certain states when consciously observed and I think there are ways to influence our personal experiences but I don't know what that says about consciousness.pmath325noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-47457615252294444962014-01-25T15:57:02.663-05:002014-01-25T15:57:02.663-05:00BTW, another discussion at Pruss' blog about p...BTW, another discussion at Pruss' blog about probability in infinite cases:<br /><a href="http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2014/01/even-more-on-infinity-and-probability.html" rel="nofollow">Pruss</a>.<br /><br />"tyrannogenius"Neil Bateshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04564859009749481136noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-49367776887355181802010-10-13T00:11:22.390-04:002010-10-13T00:11:22.390-04:00Indeed! There is a method to my madness. More or...Indeed! There is a method to my madness. More or less.<br /><br /><i>To ask for the reason for the reason for reality is not to take seriously what "an unconditioned ground" means. </i><br /><br />Unconditioned ground in the Kantian sense of the noumenal "what fundamentally exists", whose nature is in no way reflected by the phenomenon of our perceptions and concepts?<br /><br />My understanding of Kant's view is that the laws of nature, like the truths of mathematics, are knowable precisely because they make no effort to describe the world as it really is but rather prescribe the structure of the world as we experience it. All of our synthetic a priori judgments apply only to the phenomenal realm, not the noumenal. Since "the thing in itself" is entirely independent of our experience of it, we are utterly ignorant of the noumenal realm.<br /><br />But, why should I assume that any noumenal realm exists outside of my perception? I don't see a need to introduce this extra metaphysical layer. Why do you?<br /><br />This is my ultimate point. The most reasonable conclusion is that only conscious experience exists. It isn't experience "of" anything external to us, and it isn't "caused by" any underlying process. Conscious experience just exists. <br /><br />Once you accept that the conscious experience of a rock exists, what purpose does the actual rock serve? It's superfluous. If the rock can "just exist", then the experience of the rock can "just exist" too - entirely independent of the rock. <br /><br />Once you accept the existence of conscious experiences, what purpose does the brain serve? It's superfluous. If the brain can "just exist", then the experiences supposedly caused by the brain can "just exist" also.<br /><br />If not, why not? <br /><br /><br /><i>Suppose I simply do fathom that an unconditioned reason for all things includes its own rationalitym by virtue of its necessity</i><br /><br />How can an unconditioned reason be fathomed? Further, it's necessity can't be just assumed, that has to be demonstrated.<br /><br /><br /><i>There is nothing accidental about a necessary being. </i><br /><br />Show me a necessary being and then I'll believe that you might be on to something.<br /><br /><br /><i>Very nice interacting with you. </i><br /><br />Likewise!Allenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10893074877315003628noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-5679436146738133242010-10-12T13:25:12.756-04:002010-10-12T13:25:12.756-04:00It was odd to get a reply from you via email under...It was odd to get a reply from you via email under the name (?) Kelly Morgan heheh. <br /><br />Thank you for your reply. <br /><br />My abiding confusion is this: How is an unconditioned ground for all things itself in need of a grounding cause? To ask for the reason for the reason for reality is not to take seriously what "an unconditioned ground" means. <br /><br />Saying we can't know the reason why reality exists as it exists is like worrying why we can't know why there is a dilemma between reality having a coherent ground vs. not having one. That's just how reality is. It couldn't be otherwise and still be true. The same goes for the law of identity. A thing can't exist without exist, can't be what it is without being what it is. There's no "reason" for that, and hence no reason to seek a reason for it. <br /><br />My other concern is why your position always resolves into a black and white di-lemma. Suppose I simply do fathom that an unconditioned reason for all things includes its own rationalitym by virtue of its necessity, and simply dismiss your dilemma as a mere case of the "the bewitchment of language"? There is nothing accidental about a necessary being. <br /><br />Further, is there a <i>reason</i> for the dilemma between nomologicalism and accidentalism? None other than the fact that there <i>just is</i> such a dilemma, by definition. Hence, I am confused why you seem to dissolve everything else in the acid of this dilemma, without subjecting the dilemma itself to that acid. <br /><br />I admit that I am replying rather hastily, so I think I want more time to re-read your response here and ponder. Something about your argumentation just seems like a retread of the old Parminidean-Heraclitean feud, so I wonder if there is not an old solution to an old confusion in new clothes. There is nothing necessary about my birth, in a notional sense, and yet there is nothing accidental about it, in a metaphysical sense. History is the quintessential human category and seems to transcend this dilemma. I am tracking the great work of Fr Keefe in his <i>Covenantal Theology</i>. Search my blog for past discussions of "Keefe" and "Keefian". <br /><br />Heller is quite good. I don't know the other author. Very nice interacting with you. <br /><br />Best,Codgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-46016133095311228752010-10-11T11:11:15.061-04:002010-10-11T11:11:15.061-04:00Part 2:
If, however, you are right that there is ...Part 2:<br /><br /><i><b>If, however, you are right that there is no way to defend any abiding logic, why not just say your dilemma is an illusion based on an inferior grasp of a fittingly higher logic? </b></i><br /><br />Well, this comes back to my original questions...what is logic and what is reason?<br /><br />As I said before:<br /><br />"If you start with the same assumptions as I do, and make the same inferences, then you will arrive at the same conclusions. That's logic."<br /><br />Another way to put this is: "If you start with the same beliefs as I do, and your beliefs change in the same way mine do, then you will arrive at the same final beliefs that I do."<br /><br />From my own experiences, I know that in dreams and hallucinations one can believe very strange things indeed. Given that it is definitively possible to experience such things, could there be actual "worlds" that operate according to dream-logic? If not, why not?<br /><br />Is there any limit to what can be believed? Are there restrictions on how beliefs can change or what new beliefs can be developed from an initial set of beliefs? If so, what is the nature of these limits and restrictions?<br /><br />If our beliefs, assumptions, and inferences are *caused* by the underlying nature of reality, then the question becomes "why is reality that way instead of some other way"?Allenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10893074877315003628noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-59895345846454962132010-10-11T11:10:09.453-04:002010-10-11T11:10:09.453-04:00Okay, it's still not up over there, so I'l...Okay, it's still not up over there, so I'll just post the response here. <br /><br />In two parts, to get around the 4096 byte length restriction:<br /><br /><i><b>But this presupposes that there is an omni-world validity in the clash between reality being grounded on reasons and reality being grounded on sheer randomness.</b></i><br /><br />Hmmmm. Omni-world validity. <br /><br />Okay, let's say that all possible worlds exist. And we have World A whose existence and nature is explained by an infinite hierarchy of reasons - and World B, which just exists, for no reason, with no explanation.<br /><br />Either there is a reason that every possible world exists, in which case the existence of world B is not a purely random event - OR - there is no reason that every possible world exists...in which case the existence of World A *is* a purely random event (despite its infinite hierarchies of causation and explanation).<br /><br />So I would define reality as "what exists". If all possible worlds exist, then the set of all possible worlds is "reality" - singular.<br /><br />If some of what exists has a "local" explanation - but that explanation doesn't encompass *all* of what exists...then reality as a whole is still unexplained.<br /><br />To quote Michael Heller:<br /><br />"The longing to attain the ultimate explanation lingers in the implications of every scientific theory, even in a fragmentary theory of one part or aspect of the world. For why should only that part, that aspect of the world be comprehensible? It is only a part or an aspect of an entirety, after all, and if that entirety should be unexplainable, then why should only a tiny fragment thereof lend itself to explanation? But consider the reverse: if a tiny part were to elude explanation, it would leave a gap, rip a chasm, in the understanding of the entirety." <br /><br />SO...it seems to me that there is a clash between reality being grounded on reasons and reality being grounded on sheer randomness.<br /><br /><i><b>Either there is a real dilemma between infinite hierarchies and causation, or there is not.</b></i><br /><br />My main point is that once you start asserting reasons for why things are the way they are, you can never stop. Once you start explaining things, you're committed to an infinity of infinitely long explanatory/causal chains. <br /><br />If you do stop at some sort of first cause or fundamental ontological layer, you might as well have never started. You are effectively admitting (by having declared something "first" or "fundamental" and thus unexplainable in terms of anything else) that ultimately there is no reason for why things are this way instead of some other way.<br /><br /><i><b>If there is, then at least one or two "classical" principles of logic abide, namely, identity and non-contradiction. </b></i><br /><br />But what about paraconsistent logic (and the related view of dialetheism), for which the principle of non-contradiction doesn't hold? "A and not A" can be true in paraconsistent systems of logic. <br /><br />Quoting Graham Priest: <br /><br />"Though the construction of inconsistent mathematical theories (based on adjunctive paraconsistent logics) is relatively new, there are already a number of inconsistent number theories, linear algebras, category theories; and it is clear that there is much more scope in this area. The theories have not been developed with an eye to their applicability in science—just as classical group theory was not. But once the paraconsistent revolution has been digested, it is by no means implausible to suggest that these theories, or ones like them, may find physical application—just as classical group theory did."<br /><br />An interesting overview of inconsistent mathematics <a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/math-inc/" rel="nofollow">here</a>.Allenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10893074877315003628noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-47049829628892948672010-10-11T00:14:13.889-04:002010-10-11T00:14:13.889-04:00Codgitator,
I posted my not-so-brief response, it...Codgitator,<br /><br />I posted my not-so-brief response, it's just awaiting Crude's approval.Allenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10893074877315003628noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-91202316220018756792010-10-11T00:11:48.746-04:002010-10-11T00:11:48.746-04:00OK. Please let me know if I start failing the Turi...<i>OK. Please let me know if I start failing the Turing test!</i><br /><br />The fact that you haven't been convinced by my arguments is beginning to make me suspicious...Allenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10893074877315003628noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-33135283617799429302010-10-10T01:48:11.729-04:002010-10-10T01:48:11.729-04:00Hi, Allen. I left a brief reply to you in that thr...Hi, Allen. I left a brief reply to you in that thread at Crude's blog.Codgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-67922230832051658582010-10-08T14:54:03.604-04:002010-10-08T14:54:03.604-04:00OK. Please let me know if I start failing the Tur...OK. Please let me know if I start failing the Turing test!<br /><br /><i>You still have to find some means of knitting the micro-experiences into my unified experience. </i><br /><br />This is a problem. The best I can see is that micro-experiences form up into a participatory pattern which is the macro-experience.<br /><br /><i>Why *must* macro-experiences be ontologically, metaphysically reducible to micro-experiences?</i><br /><br />I'm not saying they must of necessity. But in our local reality I infer it from the fact that brain/body systems are composite structures and macro-experiences correlate with these structures.Stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14851240963321295307noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-43478654410408794702010-10-08T12:59:11.503-04:002010-10-08T12:59:11.503-04:00Indeed! Interesting to see his acknowledgement of...Indeed! Interesting to see his acknowledgement of Iain Hamilton Grant and Graham Harmon...who, with Meillassoux and Ray Brassier, make up the original "Speculative Realism" quartet.<br /><br />I check Graham Harmon's blog regularly to see if he's said anything new about Meillassoux - he has a book on Meillassoux coming out next year I think. But, I don't find his "Object Oriented Philosophy" very compelling.<br /><br />I bought Brassier's "Nihil Unbound", which had a fairly comprehensible chapter on Meillassoux...but was otherwise impenetrable. Even his "analytical" chapter on Sellars, Churchland, Dennett, and Metzinger was so strangely worded as to require sentence diagrams to decipher. He may have some interesting ideas, but if so I couldn't extract them from his obscurantist prose.<br /><br />I haven't read anything at all by Iain Grant though.Allenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10893074877315003628noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-39387749400175529162010-10-08T12:37:07.919-04:002010-10-08T12:37:07.919-04:00What would be a good answer to these skeptical que...<i>What would be a good answer to these skeptical questions?</i><br /><br />I think a good answer would be that there is no independently existing external world that explains our experiences.<br /><br />The existence of an external world can only be a starting assumption...it's not something you can unequivocally derive from the available evidence. However, it's a starting assumption that leads to problematic conclusions...and to questions with no good answers.<br /><br /><i>Without some degree of realism about the contents of experience, I'm not sure what is there to discuss</i><br /><br />All discussions are ultimately with yourself. We all live in a world of our own experience. The only question is what, if anything, lies behind that experience.<br /><br />I'm not trying to explain *your* conscious experience, I'm trying to explain mine. And I'm not necessarily trying to convince you of my position. Rather, I'm trying to convince myself of it - or, failing that, to formulate a better theory.<br /><br />So, I could write a random sentence generator and wait for it to produce interesting passages that sound like plausible explanations of my experiences...OR...I could go to this "Internets" thing and see what there is out there. This latter approach seems to work better...and is certainly easier. When I've exhausted the information available on the Interwebs, maybe I will then look into the random sentence generator.<br /><br />Additionally, I could write a Eliza-bot program that parsed my essays and which then algorithmically generated variations in response ("I don't know, why do you think consciousness is fundamental?"). A sufficiently clever Eliza-bot program would give me something useful to bounce ideas off of...but, again, the Interweb seems to do the same job fine, and requires less work on my part.<br /><br /><i>We have investigated the structure of the world thru science.</i><br /><br />I would say instead that we have investigated the structure of our experiences through science.<br /><br /><i>Thru metaphysics I arrive at my best guess that the content of the world being described is a network of micro-experiential events (as in Whitehead's actual occasions).</i><br /><br />You still have to find some means of knitting the micro-experiences into my unified experience. <br /><br />There is the network of micro-experiences - and then there is *my* experience. There must be something additional that connects the two, right? Surely it isn't admissable to just claim that my experience *is* the network of microexperiences? <br /><br />If that's permissible then why not just say that my experience *is* the interaction of quantum wavefunctions and do away with all this micro-experience talk.<br /><br />There must be something in addition to my experience and the network of micro-experiences...namely, that which connects them.<br /><br />But if micro-experiences can "just exist", why can't macro-experiences like mine just exist? <br /><br />Why *must* macro-experiences be ontologically, metaphysically reducible to micro-experiences?Allenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10893074877315003628noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-27099802574603334042010-10-07T14:33:15.202-04:002010-10-07T14:33:15.202-04:00Good find. I liked this quote he pulled from Whit...Good find. I liked this quote he pulled from Whitehead:<br /><br />"Why talk about 'the laws of nature' when what we really mean is the characteristic behaviour of phenomena within certain limits at a given stage of development in a given epoch so far as these can be ascertained?"Stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14851240963321295307noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-27443296801699688662010-10-07T14:29:08.564-04:002010-10-07T14:29:08.564-04:00So I'm thinking that "know" is the p...<i>So I'm thinking that "know" is the problem here. I think that we can have true beliefs about reality, but that we can't actually justify those beliefs. <br /><br />Okay. So, what are your reasons for believing that our experiences tell us something true about reality?<br /><br />Dreams? Hallucinations? What are they experiences "of"?</i><br /><br />What would be a good answer to these skeptical questions? Without some degree of realism about the contents of experience, I'm not sure what is there to discuss<br /><br />Re: "milieu" - I just meant environment or world.<br /><br />We have investigated the structure of the world thru science. Thru metaphysics I arrive at my best guess that the content of the world being described is a network of micro-experiential events (as in Whitehead's actual occasions).<br /><br /><i>Correlation is not causation. What is it about orderly brain function that causes conscious experience, do you think? Why would arranging quarks and electrons in certain patterns result in an experience of pain, or the experience of seeing colors?</i><br /><br />We've discussed this earlier. On the theory, the our minds are <i>composed</i> of the micro-experiential events.Stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14851240963321295307noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-39551778754076160642010-10-07T12:54:04.037-04:002010-10-07T12:54:04.037-04:00We can think the order in our observable universe ...<i>We can think the order in our observable universe is contingent, but that's not the same as saying we can't know something about it.</i><br /><br />So I'm thinking that "know" is the problem here. I think that we can have true beliefs about reality, but that we can't actually justify those beliefs. <br /><br /><i>It's not a leap of faith to reject solipcism.</i><br /><br />Okay. So, what are your reasons for believing that our experiences tell us something true about reality?<br /><br /><i>All experience is of something.</i><br /><br />Dreams? Hallucinations? What are they experiences "of"?<br /><br /><i>Experience takes place in a milieu which has order and structure.</i><br /><br />What causes you to believe this? What do you mean by "milieu"? What is the nature of this milieu?<br /><br />Merriam-Webster definition of milieu: "the physical or social setting in which something occurs or develops."<br /><br /><i>Our style of conscious experience intimately depends on this order (see how well you do without orderly brain function).</i><br /><br />Correlation is not causation. What is it about orderly brain function that causes conscious experience, do you think? Why would arranging quarks and electrons in certain patterns result in an experience of pain, or the experience of seeing colors?<br /><br /><i>Could there be a concrete reality without experience?</i><br /><br />Again, I don't know what this would mean. I only know my experience. I don't know anything about what exists outside of it.<br /><br /><i>Can there be things which offer no description in terms of mathematics?</i><br /><br />What do you mean by mathematics? The Russell/Whitehead axiomatic system, or the Zermelo-Fraenkel axiomatic system? If ZF, with or without the Axiom of Choice? And why?<br /><br />If you start with the same assumptions as I do, and make the same inferences, then you will arrive at the same conclusions. That's logic. But so what? How do I know that my assumptions and inferential judgements were correct? My conclusion may be true, but is it relevant? How can I justify my belief that it is? <br /><br />Classical logic, paraconsistent logic, quantum logic, infinitary logic, multi-valued logic, subjective logic, synthetic logic, etc. Which logic is the governing logic of reality? <br /><br />In "The Evolution of Reason" William S. Cooper claims that logic is reducible to evolutionary theory. Which, of course, just raises the question of what evolutionary theory is reducible to...<br /><br />With the correct choice of axioms and rules of inference, you can "logically" conclude anything you want. <br /><br />These conclusions may not be consistent with what we observe, but who says that everywhere is the same as here? Why should it be?Allenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10893074877315003628noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-30124626297985923282010-10-06T09:26:05.864-04:002010-10-06T09:26:05.864-04:00We can think the order in our observable universe ...We can think the order in our observable universe is contingent, but that's not the same as saying we can't know something about it.<br /><br />Some of your comments are too skeptical for me. It's not a leap of faith to reject solipcism. All experience is of something. Experience takes place in a milieu which has order and structure. Our style of conscious experience intimately depends on this order (see how well you do without orderly brain function).<br /><br />I don't know if there are parts of this local experienced reality which are necessary, but there are some candidates. Could there be a concrete reality without experience? Can there be things which offer no description in terms of mathematics? (You know the usual candidates.)Stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14851240963321295307noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-55608320204424381582010-10-05T22:52:31.581-04:002010-10-05T22:52:31.581-04:00There is manifest order in our region of the unive...<i>There is manifest order in our region of the universe.</i><br /><br />What universe?<br /><br />We have to start with our conscious experience. I think, therefore I am.<br /><br />From our observations, we make inferences about the nature of reality.<br /><br />Inferences such as: "there is an external world that exists independently of experience".<br /><br />But this leads to two questions:<br /><br />1) Why do we conclude this? What evidence leads us to to believe that conscious experience can't exist without a cause?<br /><br />2) How do we conclude this? By what process is our evidence gathered and our inferences drawn? What is the nature of this process - deterministic, probabilistic, other? How likely is it that this process produces true beliefs?<br /><br /><br /><i> Understanding how this works is part of the task of science and metaphysics.</i><br /><br />I would instead say that the task of science is *describing* what we observe, primarily using mathematics.<br /><br />The task of metaphysics is to draw conclusions about what exists.<br /><br />The two tasks are only peripherally related. Science is about what we observe. Metaphysics is about what exists.<br /><br />It requires a leap of faith to conclude that what we observe tells us *anything* about what exists.<br /><br />Doesn't it? Why do you take that leap?<br /><br /><i>But it would be a strong statement to say that you're sure that there is nothing in our local region which gives a clue to the character of the larger reality of which we're a small part.</i><br /><br />Well, no contingent feature of our local region would give us a clue to the character of the larger reality, would it? After all, it's contingent. It could have been otherwise. And thus should be otherwise *somewhere* in the larger reality.<br /><br />So what feature of our local region *isn't* contingent? What necessary features are there?Allenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10893074877315003628noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-69273109658948558952010-10-05T15:55:08.258-04:002010-10-05T15:55:08.258-04:00It's OK. But here's the issue.
There is ...It's OK. But here's the issue.<br /><br />There is manifest order in our region of the universe. Understanding how this works is part of the task of science and metaphysics.<br /><br />Now, it may be right that there is no reason for this local region to be this way. As in Meillassoux we could say that in the infinite reality of hyper-chaos there is no reason to be surprised that an ordered region popped up out the stew.<br /><br />But it would be a strong statement to say that you're sure that there is nothing in our local region which gives a clue to the character of the larger reality of which we're a small part.Stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14851240963321295307noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-10790353451011528652010-10-04T11:25:19.272-04:002010-10-04T11:25:19.272-04:00So if the Born Rule is "fixed", then in ...So if the Born Rule is "fixed", then in the same circumstances you should always see the same probability distribution. It is either a governing rule, or a consequence of some other governing rule (e.g. something to do with wave functions).<br /><br />Though the question becomes, what does "fixed" mean? How is it fixed? What enforces the rule?<br /><br />If nothing does...then it's not really fixed, it's just the way things currently are. And if there's no reason for them being this way, then there's no reason it won't change. There's no reason it won't come "unfixed".<br /><br />BUT, again, I question the need to postulate causes for our observations.<br /><br />Because then you just have to ask what causes the causes, and what causes the causes of the causes, and so on.<br /><br />If you find it acceptable that the causes have no cause, then why not just say our observations have no cause? Why is that unacceptable?Allenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10893074877315003628noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-19634320418774497132010-10-03T10:03:27.089-04:002010-10-03T10:03:27.089-04:00Right, there's no reason to think the Born rul...Right, there's no reason to think the Born rule formalism isn't fixed (in our local universe).Stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14851240963321295307noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-71277576808404797222010-10-02T21:01:55.068-04:002010-10-02T21:01:55.068-04:00But whether or not you buy the whole ontological i...<i>But whether or not you buy the whole ontological interpretation, I'm pretty sure it's clear you can't consistently interpret quantum probabilities as fixed properties of a system.</i><br /><br />The probabilities aren't a *fixed* property of the system, but the Born Rule is. Or appears to be.<br /><br />Right?Allenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10893074877315003628noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5090415448424926333.post-20928262262456715172010-10-02T14:59:53.814-04:002010-10-02T14:59:53.814-04:00I think that's right. Whether copenhagen or r...I think that's right. Whether copenhagen or relational, the probabilistic aspect of qm is irreducible, but whether the state is fixed or relational is a further question.<br /><br />A relational or perspectivist interpretation is what I tend to think about. But whether or not you buy the whole ontological interpretation, I'm pretty sure it's clear you can't consistently interpret quantum probabilities as fixed properties of a system.<br /><br />And since each interaction alters both systems (you can only step into the same river once), each event has a uniqueness, which makes it unlike our usual sense of a probabilistic outcome -- that of repeated trials of coin flips, say. This is what inspires me to see it as more a "spontaneous" or "free" event.Stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14851240963321295307noreply@blogger.com